INTRODUCTION
In recent years, as one of emerging technologies in radar system, radar network, which consists of multiple radars appropriately deployed in difference geographic positions, has shown the capability of achieving better detection and tracking performance than conventional radars (for example, monostatic radar and bistatic radar) by utilizing spatial diversity and data fusion technique [2] . Furthermore, it also shows a remarkable improvement in interference suppression and fading mitigation. It has a wide spectrum of applications, such as battlefield defense [3] [4] [5] , maritime surveillance [6] [7] [8] , weather monitoring [9] [10] [11] , etc. A typical application example of radar network is the USA's Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) radar network, which has been efficiently used in the study of severe weather [9] .
As an important issue that can not be ignored for radar network, security problem can be categorized into two types: electric countermeasure (ECM) attack and communication security. ECM attack, aiming at degrading system performance by denying or altering target Part of this work was presented at WASA 2015, Qufu, China,
August [1] . information (position, velocity, etc.) received by victim radars [3, 12] , has been a main threat of military radar network [13] . As an effective category of ECM attack [3] , deceptive ECM (DECM) attack, in which the attacker can transmit deceptive modulated signal to radars, can cause radars to calculate a false target or a target with erroneous range. It is easy to be launched by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with digital radio frequency memory, which can store, modify, and retransmit the radar signal.
Researchers have investigated the security problem of radar network from different perspectives recently [3, [14] [15] [16] [17] . For preventing data communication attacks in radar network, Lestriandoko et al. proposed a cryptographic scheme for surveillance radar network, which handles the security of communication among radar stations [15] . Comparing with the previous work, pseudorandom number generator using chaos algorithm was added to strengthen the salt cryptographic scheme. To understand the behavior of potential radar network attackers, Zhao et al. considered an ECM attack problem from the perspective of an attacker. A new deception jamming method, which can generate at most N N coherent false targets by using N UAVs was proposed, while N UAVs can only generate N coherent false targets by previous methods [16] . Assuming a network of radars where for a given cell under test, only a subset of the radars may receive [17] . This approach, based on an adaptive beamformer orthogonal rejection test, shows effective performance while suffering from computational complexity.
However, the radar network modeled earlier did not consider the data fusion, which should be an essential characteristic of radar network. Meanwhile, these works also ignored the investigation on the data fusion schemes in an ECM attack environment. In fact, it is challenging to investigate radar network with data fusion schemes under ECM attack because of the diversity of fusion schemes. In order to guarantee the security of radar network, it is necessary to design a secured data fusion scheme against ECM attack.
Motivated by this, we aim to design a secured data fusion scheme against DECM attack. Specifically, considering a radar network with measurement fusion schemes under DECM attack, we define two metrics, that is, attack strength and performance degradation, to evaluate the effect of DECM attack on radar network. By investigating the relationship between the two metrics, we prove that the radar network with conventional measurement fusion schemes is insecure to DECM attack. And we propose a new measurement fusion scheme, which shows better security performance when the DECM attack happens. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to investigate measurement fusion schemes of radar network while security problems are considered. In summary, our contributions are as follows:
We build an uniform criterion to evaluate the effect of DECM attack on radar network by constructing two parallel systems and investigating the difference between them. We prove that the radar network with conventional measurement fusion schemes is insecure when the DECM attacker assaults it. We propose a new measurement fusion scheme, which shows better security performance when DECM attack happens. In this scheme, the weight factor of each radar's measurement depends on its residual, which shows accuracy of measurement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the problem formulation is presented. In Section 3, the state estimation performance of radar network is analyzed when the DECM attacker is present. In Section 4, we present the proposed scheme and analyze its capability against the DECM attack. In Section 5, numerical stimulations are shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notations: X T stands for the transportation of matrix X. kXk F stands for the F-norm of matrix X. (X) is used to denote the spectral of matrix X. kYk 2 represents the 2norm of vector Y.˝represents Kronecker product.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
As illustrated in Figure 1 , there is a radar network model under the DECM attack launched by an UAV. It consists of a data fusion center and several radars appropriately deployed in different geographic positions. After receiving target information (e.g., position and velocity) sent by each radar, the data fusion center runs Kalman-filter-based data fusion scheme to gain the state estimation of targets.
Target dynamics and measurement equation
Similar to [18, 19] , we assume that the point target dynamic is modeled in a Cartesian coordinate by
where x k is the target state vector at time k, F is the transition matrix, and v k is an independent zeromean, white Gaussian noise with covariance Q. In the Cartesian coordinate, the state vector x k consists of position and velocity. It is assumed that the radar network is composed of n radars. The target measurement for the i-th radar is denoted as
where H is the measurement matrix of radars and w i k is an independent Gaussian noise with zero-mean and covariance R i . The pair (F, H) is assumed to be observable and
is controllable. 
Kalman-filter-based data fusion scheme
Kalman filter provides an unbiased and optimal estimation of targets state-vector in the sense of minimum estimation covariance and can be described as follows [20] [21] [22] :
where x k|k represents the state minimum mean squared error estimate, x k+1|k represents one step predicted state estimate, P k|k is the covariance of the estimate error, P k+1|k is the covariance of one step predicted state estimate, and K k is the gain at each time k. Kalman filter shows that the gain and the covariance of the estimate error converges exponentially to their steadystate value K and P, respectively. It can be easily obtained that P k|k = P, K k|k = K [23] [24] [25] .
There are two kinds of Kalman-filter-based data fusion scheme, that is, state-vector fusion and measurement fusion [26] . As shown in Figure 2 (a), in the state-vector fusion, each radar sends state estimation based on individual measurement data to fusion center to obtain an improved joint state estimation. Different from the statevector fusion, as Figure 2 directly fuses all radars' measurements, and then the final state estimation can be obtained by a central Kalman filter.
Comparing with state-vector fusion, measurement fusion provides optimal overall estimation performance [26] . Currently, three conventional methods are used for measurement fusion, that is, augmented filtering method, sequential filtering method, and combined measurement filtering method [26, 27] .
Method I: augmented filtering.
Method I integrates all radars' measurements by augmenting the measurement vector as follows [26] :
Kalman filter based on this method can be represented by the following equations:
Prediction:
Update:
Method II: sequential filtering.
Method II runs n times recursive Kalman filter for n independent, different measurements from n radars [28] . Specifically, for radar 1, 
The state estimate in fusion center at time k is
x II k|k = x II,n k|k , P II k = P II,n k .
Method III: combined measurement filtering.
Method III obtains the fused measurement by weighting measurements as [26] 
Here y, H, and R in Kalman filter are replaced by y III k , H III , and R III , respectively.
Lemma 1 ([26,27] ). With different and independent noise characteristics, n radars used for measurement fusion have linear target dynamics and identical measurement matrices, and then the measurement fusion Methods I, II, and III are equivalent and all optimal.
Thus, from Lemma 1, we only consider the security problem of radar network with Method I under the DECM attack.
DECM attack model
Consider that the DECM attack is launched by an UAV, whose goal is to degrade the radar network's estimation performance for moving targets. The UAV equipped with digital radio frequency memory can transmit deceptive modulated signals to the victim radars. For the victim radars, when the DECM attack happens, wrong measurements are calculated and sent to the fusion center. We assume that the number of the victim radars is m (m Ä n). For ease of analysis, we label them with 1, 2, : : : , m and use y i,a k (i 2 [1, m] ) to stand for wrong measurements of them. We assume that the attacker keeps action from time l; for time t l, we have Á is controllable, standard Kalman filtering analysis shows that the estimate error covariance converges exponentially [20, 29, 30] . Here we assume that the state estimate is steady before the attacker action implements.
SECURITY ANALYSIS UNDER DECM ATTACK
In this section, we evaluate the effect of the DECM attack on radar network with conventional measurement fusion schemes. According to Lemma 1, the three fusion schemes are equivalent; we only analyze the effect of the DECM attack on radar network with Method I. As Figure 3 shows, here we construct two parallel systems. Attacked system stands for the true system, which is under the DECM attack from time l. Healthy system, only constructed for analysis, represents the virtual system when there is no attacker. We evaluate the effect of the DECM attack on this radar network by investigating the difference between the two systems.
At time t(t l), the measurement vector of the healthy system is K I t , P I t|t , and P I t+1|t represent the healthy system's Kalman gain, covariance of estimate error at time t, and covariance of estimate at time t + 1, respectively. K I,a t , P I,a t|t , and P I,a t+1|t represent the attacked system's Kalman gain, Lemma 2. For the attacked system and the healthy system, we have
where t l.
Proof. (13) , (14) , and (15) are true because both the estimate error covariance and the gain have reached the steady value before attack action begins, and both the two systems exploit these static values to update the estimates.
In order to show the effect of the attack on the radar network, two metrics are defined.
Metric 1:
Attack strength y t , y I,a ty I t . It shows the measurement deviation applied by the attacker at time t. It also reflects the bias between the attacked system and the healthy system.
t is the state estimate of the attacked system at time t while x I t is that of the healthy system. x t represents the performance degradation of state estimate caused by the attack at time t. Theorem 1. If the attack strength at time t(t > l) is y t , the performance degradation of state estimate caused by the attack at time t is
where M = (I -K I H I )F.
Proof. According to (8) and (11), we have
For the attacked system, the state estimate at time t is Similarly, the state estimate at time t for the healthy system is
Based on Lemma 2, we have
where M = (I -K I H I )F. Theorem 2. If the attack strength at time t(t > l) is y t , the following statements are true:
that is, ky t k 2 Ä B, t = l, l + 1, : : :, and then the performance degradation x t also is bounded. (3) If ky t k 2 Ä B and 0 < kMk F < 1, then x t is uniformly bounded.
Proof.
(1) From Theorem 1, one can see that
Because the attack begins from time l, we have x l-1 = 0, and then
(2) According to Theorem 2(1), we have
Thus, x t is bounded.
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(3) If 0 < kMk F < 1, it can be seen that
Thus, x t is uniformly bounded. Now we consider a special case, that is, the attack strength y t is constant. Theorem 3. If the attack strength always is constant, that is, y t = y, then the following statements are true:
(2) If (M) < 1, then x t converges to -(M -I) -1 K I y I , where (M) is the spectral radius of M.
(1) From Theorem 2(1), it can be seen that
(2) From Theorem 3(1), we have
According to Lemma A in Appendix, if (M) < 1, we obtain lim t!1
x t = -(M -I) -1 K I y.
Remark 2. By constructing the two parallel systems and investigating the difference between them, a novel and uniform criterion to evaluate the effect of DECM attack on radar network has been built. From Theorem 1, we can see that for a general radar network, performance degradation x has linear relationship with attack strength y. The more the attack strength is, the larger the performance degradation is. It means that the attack has remarkable effect on estimation performance. For a special radar network, from Theorem 2, the upper bound of effect on the radar network caused by DECM attack can be evaluated. From Theorem 3(2), on the condition of (M) < 1, the stable value of x depends on y. Thus, we can conclude that the radar network with conventional measurement fusion schemes is insecure to the DECM attack.
It is necessary to design a secured measurement fusion scheme for radar network against the DECM attack. When the attack is detected, fusion center should replace the conventional measurement fusion schemes for their insecure performance.
SECURED FUSION SCHEME AGAINST DECM ATTACK
In this section, we design a secured measurement fusion scheme and analyze its performance of state estimation under the DECM attack.
Scheme description
For vector A = a 1,1 a 2,1 ... a n,1 T , we define the following operator:
For matrix X 2 C n n , let x ij represent the ij-th element of X. We define the following operator:
f (X) = 2 6 6 6 4
x 11 x 22 . . . When each radar's measurement at time k, that is, y i k (i 2 [1, n]) is given, we fuse them by
whereˆi
and u i k is the measurement residual of the i-th radar, that is,
Then, Kalman filter runs by using y k and R k . Thus, y a t and R a t are convergent.
Theorem 4. x t is convergent when y i t ! 1.
Proof. A direct result from Lemma 3, (3)- (7), (20) and (21) .
Remark 4. Theorem 4 tells us, when y i t ! 1, the attack strength y t has no effect on the performance degradation x t . In other words, on this condition, the proposed scheme shows better security performance against the DECM attack.
SIMULATION
Consider a radar network consisting of three radars and one data fusion center, which keeps surveillance of a twodimensional region. There is a target whose initial location and velocity are [20 m, 10 m], [2 m/s, 1 m/s], respectively. Its dynamic model follows (1) with Gaussian noise Q = 0, and the transition matrix Here we evaluate the estimation performance of Method I first. As Figure 4 shows, this attack causes a significant effect on the performance of state estimation. The performance degradation x, which is the gap between the two curves, has an uniform bound. For (M) < 1, it approaches a stable value, which is calculated by Theorem 3. If we use different y (from 0-100 m), as Figure 8 shows, the stable value of x increases linearly with y. Now we investigate the proposed fusion scheme. As Figure 5 shows, the proposed scheme shows worse performance estimation for higher mean square error of Y position when the attacker is absent. However, we must remark that the performance estimation of the proposed scheme can be tolerated. As you can see, after 200 s, the gap between the dotted curve and solid curve is very small. If the same attack happens, as Figure 6 shows, x of the proposed scheme is much less than that of the conventional fusion scheme, which means that the radar network with the proposed fusion scheme is more secure when the attack happens. We also study x under different attack strength y. As Figure 7 shows, in the radar network with fusion Method I, when y = 10m, x is much higher than that when y = 5m, while in the radar network with the proposed scheme, they are approximately equivalent. In Figure 8 , Method I has a linear relationship between the stable value of x and y. However, in the proposed scheme, except the situation that y is very small, the stable value of x shows no obvious relationship with y.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of a radar network with measurement fusion scheme under DECM attack. We built an uniform criterion to evaluate the effect of the DECM attack. We proved that the radar network with conventional measurement fusion schemes is insecure to the DECM attack. We further proposed a secured measurement fusion scheme against the DECM attack. We presented simulation results to illustrate the effect of the DECM attack on radar network and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme against this attack. It is feasible to extend the proposed fusion scheme in radar network with state-vector fusion scheme, which will be discussed in the future work.
